Blair agrees more information needed.5 JULY Blair faxed letter from Sir Kevin that highlights that day's Times report giving clues on Gilligan's source. Blair agrees further interview needed with Kelly.7 JULY During early morning phone call to Gavyn Davies, BBC chairman, Blair reveals "someone has come forward as a source". Mr Powell tells him Sir David Omand, Sir David Manning and John Scarlett decide to wait for results of Kelly interview that day with MoD officials. Letter from Sir Kevin Tebbit says that not enough details emerge from the interview. Gets Blair's permission to appear on Channel 4 News attacking the BBC.29 JUNE Blair tells Campbell to "wait and see" what the FAC report says.3 JULY Blair told by Jonathan Powell that an MoD official has admitted contact with Gilligan.4 JULY Blair at Chequers Probably told Kelly's name for first time.

Did not want Foreign Affairs Select Committee (FAC) to deal with it.12 JUNE Blair has lunch at owning Street with BBC executives. Gilligan dispute not raised by PM.26 JUNE Campbell gives evidence to FAC and reignites the row27 JUNE Campbell at Wimbledon Furious at letter from BBC rebutting his charges. "You have something that is no longer a small item," Blair says.4 JUNE Blair tells Parliament that he wants the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) to deal with the allegation. Also aware Alastair Campbell putting suggestions to Mr Scarlett.29 MAY 2003 Blair in Basra with British troops when Gilligan broadcast goes out.30 MAY Blair orders staff in Downing Street to check out the Gilligan claims with Mr Scarlett and the Joint Intelligence Committee.3 JUNE Blair sees Mail on Sunday article naming Alastair Campbell as sexing up dossier. LATE AUGUST 2002 George Bush and Tony Blair agree in a phone call that they "really had to confront this issue [of Iraq], devise our strategy and get on with it".3 SEPTEMBER Blair announces that a dossier on Iraqi WMD will be published. Claimed yesterday he wanted to share with the public the "tremendous amount of information and evidence coming across my desk".10 SEPTEMBER Blair sees draft of dossier for first time.11 SEPTEMBER Blair is aware his staff tell John Scarlett they want the "strongest" possible case against Saddam put in the dossier. George Bush and Tony Blair agree in a phone call that they "really had to confront this issue [of Iraq], devise our strategy and get on with it".

He added that there "was not a specific discussion" in Downing Street to approve it.QUESTION: If you did not approve this naming strategy, did Mr Hoon? If Mr Hoon didn't, how could such an important decision be left in the hands of a chief press officer?. He admitted the only way he could actually be sure was if the BBC confirmed it.QUESTION: Why then did you approve a press statement about Dr Kelly and allow him to be named by the MoD at a stage when you weren't actually "sure" whether he was the BBC's main source?EVIDENCE: Mr Blair repeatedly emphasised that he had put out the press statement only with the personal approval of Dr Kelly.QUESTION: Why, if you needed the personal approval of Dr Kelly for the press statement giving clues to his identity, did you not seek Dr Kelly's approval for the new strategy of revealing his name to journalists?EVIDENCE: The Prime Minister said that he had not seen the MoD press office's Q&A that led to the naming of Dr Kelly. Mr Blair repeated the comments he had made to Parliament: "I can't say this month or next or even this year or next that he will use his weapons."QUESTION: But Mr Blair also told Parliament that "the present threat" was "real". But I mean the only thing I would say, my Lord, is that if we had named him in the statement, I do not think the outcome in terms of him appearing in front of the FAC or any of the rest of it would have been any different.THE UNANSWERED QUESTIONSBy Paul WaughEVIDENCE: Mr Blair was asked why he had ignored a warning from Jonathan Powell, his chief of staff, not to present Iraq as a threat "at the moment". One alternative was certainly to make an open statement and name him upfront. I think the reason for the hesitation there was: Well, we could not be absolutely sure about this.

I seem to recollect that there was some issue as to whether Dr Kelly did not want to be named in what I think was called the first wave of media focus on it. I have to say that I think by then the MoD and all of us were in quite a difficult position. We did not want to keep this information quiet.Lord Hutton: Now, do you think that it might have been a more appropriate procedure if the source had simply been named in the statement?Blair: I have obviously thought very carefully about whether there were alternative ways of dealing with this. And, secondly, because once you had copied it to the Foreign Affairs Committee - I mean, I thought there was a remote possibility the FAC might decide not to interview him, but I rather thought they would.Dingemans: Were you aware of the existence of the defensive Q and A material?Blair: I was not, but I, you know, would have thought it perfectly natural that the MoD had to prepare to field inquiries ... I think, first of all, we were at any point concerned, as I said a moment or two ago - I think we were quite surprised it had not already come out, but we thought that it was likely to come out at any particular point.